Background / CV
I am a Professor of Psychology and Chair of the Cognitive Science Program at Yale University. (I joined the faculty at Yale as an Assistant Professor in 2001, was an Associate Professor on Term from 2005-2006, and was an Associate Professor without Term from 2006-2010.) Before coming to Yale I was at Harvard University, working as a postdoctoral fellow in the Vision Sciences Laboratory of the Department of Psychology. At Harvard I worked primarily with Ken Nakayama. I received my PhD from Rutgers University, where I worked with Zenon Pylyshyn, who was the director of the Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science. (My dissertation committee also included Jacob Feldman, Jerry Fodor, Alan Leslie, and Anne Triesman.) Earlier, I was an undergraduate at Carleton College in Northfield, Minnesota ("town of cows, colleges, and contentment"), where I studied computer science and also psychology. I grew up in what used to be a rural part of Hudson, Wisconsin.
Working back through my academic lineage uncovered some interesting facts -- e.g. that my academic great-great-great-great grandfather was the first student ever awarded a PhD in Psychology from Yale, in 1895; and that my academic great-great-great-great-great grandfather established the original Yale Psychological Laboratory.
The journal American Psychologist published this short professional biography in 2006. Or, you can read a shorter, more formal, and more recent biographical blurb.
You can download or view a copy of my CV, or see a list of my papers on Google Scholar.
Recent Research Topics
Research in our laboratory spans several topics in cognitive science, with a primary focus in recent work on visual cognition. Much of our work involves computer-based psychophysical experiments with human adults. In collaboration with several other laboratories, we are also exploring several of the topics below in computational models, human infants, nonhuman primates, brain-damaged patients, and children with autism spectrum disorder. Below are descriptions of a few specific topics in this area that we are currently exploring -- all of which involve questions about how seeing relates to thinking. For detailed discussions of our interests in these areas, see the papers listed on the 'Papers / Books' page. Demonstrations of many of the phenomena and experimental paradigms used in our visual cognition research can be found on the Demonstrations page, along with more detailed descriptions of various experiments.
A central interest of our laboratory in recent years has been the nature of visual awareness. How and when is it produced? What factors determine whether we will become conscious of a visual stimulus? And what sorts of visual processing can and cannot occur without awareness? We address such questions in part by employing several startling phenomena in which we lose conscious awareness of various aspects of visual scenes. In sustained inattentional blindness, observers fail to perceive unexpected objects in visual scenes even though the 'missed' objects are in full view for several seconds, are in motion, and have features that differ from all other items in the display. In motion-induced blindness, salient (and even attended) objects fluctuate into and out of conscious awareness repeatedly when superimposed onto certain global motion patterns. We have been exploring these phenomena and others, and we have developed a perceptual cycle account of sustained inattentional blindness, and the perceptual scotoma theory of motion-induced blindness. Such phenomena allow us to explore the roles of attention and 'unconscious inferences' as gateways to conscious perception.
How Seeing Relates to Thinking
Choi, H., & Scholl, B. J. (under review). Incidental change blindness in an extremely simple event.
New, J. J., & Scholl, B. J. (2018). Motion-induced blindness for dynamic targets: Further explorations of the 'perceptual scotoma' hypothesis. Journal of Vision, 18(9):24, 1-13.
Ward, E. J., Bear, A., & Scholl, B. J. (2016). Can you perceive ensembles without perceiving individuals?: The role of statistical perception in determining whether awareness overflows access. Cognition, 152, 78-86.
Ward, E. J., & Scholl, B. J. (2015). Inattentional blindness reflects limitations on perception, not memory: Evidence from repeated failures of awareness. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 22(3), 722-727.
Ward, E. J., & Scholl, B. J. (2015). Stochastic or systematic?: Seemingly random perceptual switching in bistable events triggered by transient unconscious cues. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 41(4), 929-939.
Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2014). 'Please tap the shape, anywhere you like': Shape skeletons in human vision revealed by an exceedingly simple measure. Psychological Science, 25(2), 377-386.
New, J. J., & Scholl, B. J. (2008). 'Perceptual scotomas': A functional account of motion-induced blindness. Psychological Science, 19(7), 653-659.
Most, S. B., Scholl, B. J., Clifford, E., & Simons, D. J. (2005). What you see is what you set: Sustained inattentional blindness and the capture of awareness. Psychological Review, 112(1), 217-242.
Mitroff, S. R., & Scholl, B. J. (2005). Forming and updating object representations without awareness: Evidence from motion-induced blindness. Vision Research, 45(8), 961-967.
Scholl, B. J., Simons, D. J., & Levin, D. T. (2004). 'Change blindness' blindness: An implicit measure of a metacognitive error. In D. T. Levin (Ed.), Thinking and seeing: Visual metacognition in adults and children (pp. 145-164). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Mitroff, S. R., & Scholl, B. J. (2004). Perceiving the disappearance of unseen objects. Perception, 33(10), 1267-1273.
Most, S. B., Simons, D. J., Scholl, B. J., Jiminez, R., Clifford, E., & Chabris, C. F. (2001). How not to be seen: The contribution of similarity and selective ignoring to sustained inattentional blindness. Psychological Science, 12(1), 9-17.
Most, S. B., Simons, D. J., Scholl, B. J., & Chabris, C. F. (2000). Sustained inattentional blindness: The role of location in the detection of unexpected dynamic events. Psyche, 6(14).
How does perception relate to cognition? In a way, nearly all of the research in our lab has explored this question -- for example as we investigate the visual processing of properties (such as animacy, causality, or persistence) that we typically associate with higher-level thinking. The conclusion that we draw from this research can be summarized as: vision is smart. But another hallowed question is whether higher-level cognitive states (such as knowledge, desires, and intentions) can directly influence visual processing and help to determine what we see. If so, then there are 'top-down effects' of cognition on perception, and perception is 'cognitively penetrable'. We have been exploring several modern incarnations of this question, and the conclusion that we draw from this research is that there are in fact no such effects: vision is vision, not just another type of cognition. Seeing is a distinct encapsulated process in the mind compared to the rest of cognition.
van Buren, B., & Scholl, B. J. (under review). The 'blindfold test' for deciding whether an effect reflects visual processing or higher-level judgment.
Scholl, B. J., & Firestone, C. (under review). Seven reasons why recent work has (still) failed to demonstrate top-down effects of action on perception.
van Buren, B., & Scholl, B. J. (in press). Visual illusions as a tool for dissociating seeing from thinking: A reply to Braddick (2018). Perception.
Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2017). Seeing and thinking in studies of embodied "perception": How (not) to integrate vision science and social psychology. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12(2), 341-343.
Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2016). Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for 'top-down' effects [target article]. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, e229, 1-77.
Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2016). Seeing and thinking: Foundational issues and empirical horizons [response to commentators]. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, e229, 53-67.
Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2016). 'Moral perception' reflects neither morality nor perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20(2), 75-76.
Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2015). Enhanced visual awareness for morality and pajamas?: Perception vs. memory in 'top-down' effects. Cognition, 136, 409-416.
Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2015). Can you experience 'top-down' effects on perception?: The case of race categories and perceived lightness. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 22(3), 694-700.
Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2015). When do ratings implicate perception vs. judgment?: The 'overgeneralization test' for top-down effects. Visual Cognition, 23(9-10), 1217-1226.
Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2014). 'Top-down' effects where none should be found: The El Greco fallacy in perception research. Psychological Science, 25(1), 38-46
A central lesson of cognitive science is that we typically take for granted some of our most important underlying cognitive processes. One example of this, we maintain, is the mental computation of object persistence -- the automatic representation of parts of visual scenes as the same enduring individual objects over time, motion, occlusion, and featural change. Without the ability to compute object persistence, visual experience would be incoherent -- yet such processing has received surprisingly little study in recent decades. As such, a major recent research thrust in our lab has been the attempt to determine the nature of such processing. In particular, we are exploring (1) the dynamic visual properties which cause a part of the visual field to be treated as the same object over time, and (2) the related principles which help solve correspondence problems -- 'which went where?' -- in complex dynamic scenes. This research project has involved many different experimental paradigms, including multiple object tracking, object reviewing, change detection, and the tunnel effect. Theoretically, we've developed an account of object persistence that encompasses the nature of such processing in adults, infants, and nonhuman primates, and we've argued that this body of research can provide important constraints on classic philosophical theories of persistence. This work continues in our laboratory as an ongoing 'case study' in cognitive science.
Visually Carving the World at its Joints
Meyerhoff, H. S., & Scholl, B. J. (2018). Auditory-induced bouncing is a perceptual (rather than a cognitive) phenomenon: Evidence from illusory crescents. Cognition, 170, 88-94.
Liverence, B. M., & Scholl, B. J. (2015). Object persistence enhances spatial navigation: A case study in smartphone vision science. Psychological Science, 26(7), 955-963.
Franconeri, S. L., Pylyshyn, Z. W., & Scholl, B. J. (2012). A simple proximity heuristic allows tracking of multiple objects through occlusion. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 74(4), 691-702.
Scholl, B. J., & Flombaum, J. I. (2010). Object persistence. In B. Goldstein (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Perception, Volume 2 (pp. 653-657). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Gao, T., & Scholl, B. J. (2010). Are objects required for object files?: Roles of segmentation and spatiotemporal continuity in computing object persistence. Visual Cognition, 18(1), 82-109
Cheries, E. W., Mitroff, S. R., Wynn, K., & Scholl, B. J. (2009). Do the same principles constrain persisting object representations in infant cognition and adult perception?: The cases of continuity and cohesion. In B. Hood & L. Santos (Eds.), The Origins of Object Knowledge (pp. 107-134). Oxford University Press.
Flombaum, J. I., Scholl, B. J., & Santos, L. R. (2009). Spatiotemporal priority as a fundamental principle of object persistence. In B. Hood & L. Santos (Eds.), The Origins of Object Knowledge (pp. 135-164). Oxford University Press.
Yi, D-J., Turk-Browne, N. B., Flombaum, J. I., Kim, M., Scholl, B. J., & Chun, M. M. (2008). Spatiotemporal object continuity in human ventral visual cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105(26), 8840-8845.
Flombaum, J. I., Scholl, B. J., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (2008). Attentional resources in tracking through occlusion: The high-beams effect. Cognition, 107(3), 904-931.
Cheries, E. W., Mitroff, S. R., Wynn, K., & Scholl, B. J. (2008). Cohesion as a principle of object persistence in infancy. Developmental Science, 11(3), 427-432.
Scholl, B. J. (2007). Object persistence in philosophy and psychology. Mind & Language, 22(5), 563-591.
Flombaum, J. I., & Scholl, B. J. (2006). A temporal same-object advantage in the tunnel effect: Facilitated change detection for persisting objects. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 32(4), 840-853.
Cheries, E. W., Wynn, K., & Scholl, B. J. (2006). Interrupting infants' persisting object representations: An object-based limit? Developmental Science, 9(5), F50-F58.
Mitroff, S. R., Scholl, B. J., & Wynn, K. (2005). The relationship between object files and conscious perception. Cognition, 96(1), 67-92.
Noles, N. S., Scholl, B. J., & Mitroff, S. R. (2005). The persistence of object file representations. Perception & Psychophysics, 67(2), 324-334.
Flombaum, J. I., Kundey, S. M., Santos, L. R., & Scholl, B. J. (2004). Dynamic object individuation in rhesus macaques: A study of the tunnel effect. Psychological Science, 15(12), 795-800.
Mitroff, S. R., Scholl, B. J., & Wynn, K. (2004). Divide and conquer: How object files adapt when a persisting object splits into two. Psychological Science, 15(6), 420-425.
Scholl, B. J., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1999). Tracking multiple items through occlusion: Clues to visual objecthood. Cognitive Psychology, 38, 259-290.
The retinal input to visual processing is intrinsically continuous, whereas our mental representations of scenes are composed of discrete objects. A major challenge of visual perception is to parse the world in this way, starting with a confusion of features and ending up with a structured array of individuals. We have been exploring this process, focusing in particular on demonstrating how visual attention interacts in rich and interesting ways with the underlying structure of visual scenes. Attention is often allocated not only to spatial regions of the visual field, but to discrete visual objects. Whereas vision scientists have traditionally studied the recognition of specific objects, we are using computer-based experiments to determine what can count as an attended object in the first place, and thus to determine the nature of the fundamental units over which visual attention can operate. Our recent research has shown how object-based effects can be independently strengthened or weakened by multiple types of visual structure (including structure in other dimensions such as time, and in other modalities such as audition), and has begun to illustrate how the 'objects' of object-based attention are formed from simpler visual features. This work has led to several recent discoveries, such as the phenomenon of attentional rhythm, the existence of event type representations, and the one-is-more illusion. This research is closely connected to issues in many other areas of cognitive science. As one example of this, we have suggested that the study of the infant's 'object concept' and the study of mid-level object-based visual processing in adults may have much more to do with each other than has been previously suspected.
Perceiving Animacy and Causality
Ongchoco, J. D. K., & Scholl, B. J. (under review). Did that just happen? Event segmentation influences enumeration and working memory for simple overlapping visual events.
Yousif, S. R., & Scholl, B. J. (in press). The one-is-more illusion: Sets of discrete objects appear less extended than equivalent continuous entities in both space and time. Cognition.
Strickland, B., & Scholl, B. J. (2015). Visual perception involves 'event type' representations: The case of containment vs. occlusion. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144(3), 570-580.
De Freitas, J., Liverence, B. M., & Scholl, B. J. (2014). Attentional rhythm: A temporal analogue of object-based attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(1), 71-76.
Liverence, B. M., & Scholl, B. J. (2011). Selective attention warps spatial representation: Parallel but opposing effects on attended versus inhibited objects. Psychological Science, 22(12), 1600-1608.
Scholl, B. J. (2009). What have we learned about attention from multiple object tracking (and vice versa)? In D. Dedrick & L. Trick (Eds.), Computation, cognition, and Pylyshyn (pp. 49-78). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Doran, M. M., Hoffman, J. E., & Scholl, B. J. (2009). The role of eye fixations in concentration and amplification effects during multiple object tracking. Visual Cognition, 17(4), 574-597.
Ben-Shahar, O., Scholl, B. J., & Zucker, S. W. (2007). Attention, segregation, and textons: Bridging the gap between object-based attention and texton-based segregation. Vision Research, 47(6), 845-860.
Cheries, E. W., Newman, G. E., Santos, L. R., & Scholl, B. J. (2006). Units of visual individuation in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta): Objects or unbound visual features? Perception, 35(8), 1057-1071.
Alvarez, G. A., & Scholl, B. J. (2005). How does attention select and track spatially extended objects?: New effects of attentional concentration and amplification. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134(4), 461-476.
Marino, A. C., & Scholl, B. J. (2005). The role of closure in defining the 'objects' of object-based attention. Perception & Psychophysics, 67(7), 1140-1149.
vanMarle, K., & Scholl, B. J. (2003). Attentive tracking of objects vs. substances. Psychological Science, 14(5), 498-504.
Scholl, B. J. (2001). Objects and attention: The state of the art. Cognition, 80(1/2), 1-46.
Scholl, B. J., Pylyshyn, Z. W., & Feldman, J. (2001). What is a visual object? Evidence from target merging in multiple object tracking. Cognition, 80(1/2), 159-177.
Scholl, B. J., & Leslie, A. M. (1999). Explaining the infant's object concept: Beyond the perception/cognition dichotomy. In E. Lepore & Z. Pylyshyn (Eds.), What is cognitive science? (pp. 26-73). Oxford: Blackwell.
We experience the world not only in terms of visual objects, but also in terms of discrete but dynamic visual events. As case studies of higher-level event perception and cognition, we are also exploring the nature of phenomena wherein dynamic displays consisting only of simple geometric shapes nevertheless give rise to rich percepts involving causation, animacy, and goal-directedness. Such phenomena are of particular interest because they seem to reflect primarily visual processing rather than higher-level inference, despite the high-level nature of the resulting interpretations. These effects emphasize that perception concerns not only a recovery of the physical structure of the world, but also a recovery of its causal and social structure. Our latest projects in the perception of causality focus on how even static objects may be visually represented according to their inferred causal histories. Our latest projects in the perception of animacy focus on the "psychophysics of chasing" and phenomena such as the "wolfpack effect", and on how perceiving animacy irresistibly influences various other types of cognition.
Colombatto, C., & Scholl, B. J. (under review). Illusions of morality: Visual impressions of causality override overt judgment in moral decision making.
Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (under review). Seeing stability: Physical understanding is rooted in automatic visual processing
Gao, T., New, J. J., & Scholl, B. J. (under review). Attention to intention: The perceived goals of moving shapes control how they are attended.
Colombatto, C., van Buren, B., & Scholl, B. J. (in press). Intentionally distracting: Working memory is disrupted by the perception of other agents attending to you -- even without eye-gaze cues. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review.
van Buren, B., & Scholl, B. J. (2017). Minds in motion in memory: Enhanced spatial memory driven by the perceived animacy of simple shapes. Cognition, 163, 87-92.
van Buren, B., Gao, T., & Scholl, B. J. (2017). What are the underlying units of perceived animacy?: Chasing detection is intrinsically object-based. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24(5), 1604-1610.
Chen, Y. -C., & Scholl, B. J. (2016). The perception of history: Seeing causal history in static shapes induces illusory motion perception. Psychological Science, 27(6), 923-930.
van Buren, B., Uddenberg, S., & Scholl, B. J. (2016). The automaticity of perceiving animacy: Goal-directed motion in simple shapes influences visuomotor behavior even when task-irrelevant. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23, 797-802.
Scholl, B. J., & Gao, T. (2013). Perceiving animacy and intentionality: Visual processing or higher-level judgment? In M. D. Rutherford & V. A. Kuhlmeier (Eds.), Social perception: Detection and interpretation of animacy, agency, and intention (pp. 197-230). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gao, T., Scholl, B. J., & McCarthy, G. (2012). Dissociating the detection of intentionality from animacy in the right posterior superior temporal sulcus. Journal of Neuroscience, 32(41), 14276-14280.
Gao, T., & Scholl, B. J. (2011). Chasing vs. stalking: Interrupting the perception of animacy. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 37(3), 669-684.
Gao, T., McCarthy, G., & Scholl, B. J. (2010). The wolfpack effect: Perception of animacy irresistibly influences interactive behavior. Psychological Science, 21(12), 1845-1853.
Gao, T., Newman, G. E., & Scholl, B. J. (2009). The psychophysics of chasing: A case study in the perception of animacy. Cognitive Psychology, 59(2), 154-179.
Newman, G. E., Choi, H., Wynn, K., & Scholl, B. J. (2008). The origins of causal perception: Evidence from postdictive processing in infancy. Cognitive Psychology, 57(3), 262-291.
Choi, H., & Scholl, B. J. (2006). Perceiving causality after the fact: Postdiction in the temporal dynamics of causal perception. Perception, 35(3), 385-399.
Wagemans, J., Van Lier, R., & Scholl, B. J. (2006). Introduction to Michotte's heritage in perception and cognition research. Acta Psychologica, 123(1-2), 1-19.
Choi, H., & Scholl, B. J. (2006). Measuring causal perception: Links to representational momentum? Acta Psychologica, 123(1-2), 91-111.
Scholl, B. J., & Nakayama, K. (2004). Illusory causal crescents: Misperceived spatial relations due to perceived causality. Perception, 33(4), 455-469.
Choi, H., & Scholl, B. J. (2004). Effects of grouping and attention on the perception of causality. Perception & Psychophysics, 66(6), 926-942.
Scholl, B. J., & Nakayama, K. (2002). Causal capture: Contextual effects on the perception of collision events. Psychological Science, 13(6), 493-498.
Scholl, B. J., & Tremoulet, P. (2000). Perceptual causality and animacy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(8), 299-309.
We typically think of perception as the recovery of increasingly rich information about individual objects, but there are also massive amounts of information that are both (1) distributed across objects, and (2) embodied in relations between objects in space and time. We are exploring the perception of such information in two ways. First, we are exploring the nature of perceptual averaging, wherein the mind can quickly and efficiently compute summary statistics of a scene -- e.g. computing the average size of an array of objects, or the average pitch of a sequence of tones. Here we've shown in several ways that perceptual averaging is more powerful than previously suspected -- and well adapted to natural visual environments. Second, in studies of visual statistical learning, we are exploring the ways in which we unintentionally and unconsciously learn about the relationships between objects -- showing that this process too is far more powerful than previously demonstrated. In these ways, we are learning about some surprising abilities possessed by the visual system that are not apparent from our conscious experience.
Other Active Research Interests
Uddenberg, S., Newman, G. E., & Scholl, B. J. (under review). Perceptual averaging in visual communication: Ensemble representations in the perception of scientific data in graphs
Albrecht, A. R., Scholl, B. J., & Chun, M. M. (2012). Perceptual averaging by eye and ear: Computing summary statistics from multimodal stimuli. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 74(5), 810-815.
Turk-Browne, N. B., Scholl, B. J., Johnson, M. K., & Chun, M. M. (2010). Implicit perceptual anticipation triggered by statistical learning. Journal of Neuroscience, 30(33), 11177-11187.
Albrecht, A. R., & Scholl, B. J. (2010). Perceptually averaging in a continuous visual world: Extracting statistical summary representations over time. Psychological Science, 21(4), 560-567.
Scholl, B. J., & Turk-Browne, N. B. (2010). Statistical learning. In B. Goldstein (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Perception, Volume 2 (pp. 935-938). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Turk-Browne, N. B., Scholl, B. J., Chun, M. M., & Johnson, M. K. (2009). Neural evidence of statistical learning: Efficient detection of visual regularities without awareness. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21(10), 1934-1945.
Turk-Browne, N. B., & Scholl, B. J. (2009). Flexible visual statistical learning: Transfer across space and time. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 35(1), 195-202.
Turk-Browne, N. B., Isola, P. J., Scholl, B. J., & Treat, T. A. (2008). Multidimensional visual statistical learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 34(2), 399-407.
Fiser, J., Scholl, B. J., & Aslin, R. N. (2007). Perceived object trajectories during occlusion constrain visual statistical learning. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14(1), 173-178.
Junge, J. A., Scholl, B. J., & Chun, M. M. (2007). How is spatial context learning integrated over time?: A primacy effect in contextual cueing. Visual Cognition, 15(1), 1-11.
Turk-Browne, N. B., Junge, J. A., & Scholl, B. J. (2005). The automaticity of visual statistical learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134(4), 552-564.
Endress, A. D., Scholl, B. J., & Mehler, J. (2005). The role of salience in the extraction of algebraic rules. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134(3), 406-419.
Our laboratory also maintains several other active research interests, including cognitive development and 'theory of mind', subjective time dilation, aesthetic visual experience, the efficient communication of visual information, and the foundations of cognitive science. We are particularly interested in the question of how cognitive science succeeds as a coherent, unified discipline.
Raila, H., & Scholl, B. J. (under review). Could some effects of emotion on cognition be driven by visual features, rather than semantic content?: Four case studies using the IAPS images.
Uddenberg, S., & Scholl, B. J. (under review). Angrier = blacker?: The influence of emotional expression on the representation of race in faces, measured with serial reproduction.
Uddenberg, S., & Scholl, B. J. (under review). Ten angry men: Serial reproduction reveals that angry faces are represented as more masculine.
Liverence, B. M., & Scholl, B. J. (under review). Selective attention increases the refresh rate of visual awareness.
Uddenberg, S., & Scholl, B. J. (2018). TeleFace: Serial reproduction of faces reveals a Whiteward bias in race memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147(10), 1466-1487.
Chen, Y. -C., Colombatto, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2018). Looking into the future: An inward bias in aesthetic experience driven only by gaze cues. Cognition, 176, 209-214.
Lowet, A. S., Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2018). Seeing structure: Shape skeletons modulate perceived similarity. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 80(5), 1278-1289.
Scholl, B. J. (2017). Reliability in psychology: Means versus ends. APS Observer, 30(9), 38-39.
Raila, H., Scholl, B. J., & Gruber, J. (2015). Seeing the world through rose-colored glasses: People who are happy and satisfied with life preferentially attend to positive stimuli. Emotion, 15(4), 449-462.
Chen, Y. -C., & Scholl, B. J. (2014). Seeing and liking: Biased perception of ambiguous figures consistent with the 'inward bias' in aesthetic preferences. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 21(6), 1444-1451.
Newman, G. E., & Scholl, B. J. (2012). Bar graphs depicting averages are perceptually misinterpreted: The 'within-the-bar' bias. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 19(4), 601-607.
Liverence, B. M., & Scholl, B. J. (2012). Discrete events as units of perceived time. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 38(3), 549-554.
New, J. J., Schultz, R. T., Wolf, J., Niehaus, J. L., Klin, A., German, T., & Scholl, B. J. (2010). The scope of social attention deficits in autism: Prioritized orienting to people and animals in static natural scenes. Neuropsychologia, 48(1), 51-59.
New, J. J., & Scholl, B. J. (2009). Subjective time dilation: Spatially local, object-based, or a global visual experience? Journal of Vision, 9(2):4, 1-11, http://journalofvision.org/9/2/4/.
Turk-Browne, N. B., Scholl, B. J., & Chun, M. M. (2008). Babies and brains: Habituation in infant cognition and functional neuroimaging. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 2, Article 16
Scholl, B. J. (2005). Innateness and (Bayesian) visual perception: Reconciling nativism and development. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, & S. Stich (Eds.), The innate mind: Structure and contents (pp. 34-52). Oxford University Press.
Scholl, B. J. (2004). Can infants' object concepts be trained? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(2), 49-51.
Scholl, B. J., & Leslie, A. M. (2001). Minds, modules, and meta-analysis. Child Development, 72(3), 696-701.
Scholl, B. J., & Leslie, A. M. (1999). Modularity, development, and 'Theory of Mind'. Mind & Language, 14(1), 131-153.